Does the Kimberley Process have a future?

The diamond trade is known for its role in financing armed conflicts. For 13 years, an international diamond certification system – the Kimberley Process – has struggled to stem the link between conflicts and “blood diamonds”. Despite the positive results claimed by the defenders of the process, the reality on the ground seems less rosy. Analysis.

Entered into force in 2003, the Kimberley Process Certification System (KPCS) aims to stem the financing of armed conflicts through the diamond trade. By establishing this process, several governments, the private diamond sector and representatives of civil society responded positively to the cry of alarm launched in 1998 by the NGOs Global Witness and Partnership Africa-Canada on the role of this precious stone. in the financing of civil wars in Angola, Sierra Leone and Liberia. Insufficient and harmful? Now with 81 participating countries, the Kimberley Process is defended by its promoters as a major instrument of peace and security in the world. To take part in the process, participating countries are supposed not to produce “conflict diamonds”, only trade with each other and certify each of their diamond shipments as conflict free. Still according to its defenders, this method would have made it possible to reduce the share of conflict diamonds present on the legal market to 1%, compared to 15% in the 1990s. However, in 2011, Global Witness made the headlines by announcing its withdrawal from the program. In doing so, it gave substance to the growing concerns of many civilian actors: Kimberley would be insufficient or even harmful to the fight against blood diamonds. Today, the pressure on our planet's mineral and natural resources has increased further. The relentless competition between States and private companies for access to the subsoil is intensified, effectively causing an increase in mining conflicts; diamond dealers included. Armed conflicts, certainly, but also more broadly, social, economic and environmental conflicts. To better understand the future, let us draw the right lessons from the past: what criticisms are leveled at the Kimberley process? Can these inspire the architecture of a new and more ambitious regulatory tool? An insufficiently ambitious regime The major problem with the Kimberley Process is its lack of ambition. The KPCS is effectively committed to stopping the trade in “rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance armed conflicts which aim to destabilize legitimate governments”. This definition is too restrictive. Concerning diamonds first, since it does not imply any kind of control over the illegal trade in already polished stones, whose transactions which “amount to millions of dollars on the black market nevertheless suggest obvious flaws; loopholes through which illicit and conflict diamonds are suspected of entering the legal market ". What's more, the duty to certify diamonds is carried out "per cargo", whereas it should, for greater efficiency, be carried out per unit. It is indeed easy to slip illegal stones into certified conflict-free shipments. Smuggling is made easier and fuels a significant black market. The purchase and sale of conflict diamonds thus fuels tax evasion practices and money laundering while terrorist associations use it to conceal the origin of their dirty money . Next, note that the type of conflict covered by the KPCS should also be reassessed. According to the definition, diamonds are considered conflict diamonds only if they were used to finance the “rebel” side of a civil war. In other words, stones extracted unethically and potentially linked to acts of torture, assassination or rape committed by a regular army will receive a certified conflict free label and will easily enter the legal market. The decision by the participants in the Kimberley process to authorize Zimbabwe to export its production of diamonds from the Marangue fields is also the element which decided Global Witness to withdraw from the process. Zimbabwean government authorities, government forces and President Mugabe are accused of acts of violence and human rights violations perpetrated against the civilian population, artisanal diggers and international smugglers with the aim of taking control of this which is considered by some to be the largest diamond field ever discovered in over a century. Today, acts of torture, forced labor, but also corruption and embezzlement of money are still being denounced. 2 billion dollars from mining revenues which could have been used for local development were thus disappeared of the national funds . In December 2013, however, the European Union gave in to the Belgian and European diamond industry lobby by authorizing the purchase in Antwerp of 300,000 carats from the diamond fields. Marangue. Finally, let us emphasize that the Kimberley process does not take environmental risks into account. However, armed conflicts do not have a monopoly on horror. Extractivism, even when carried out under legal conditions, is known for its damage to communities as well as their ecosystems and can cause more or less violent social conflicts. In 2015 alone, the almost total drying up of Lake Poopo (Bolivia) due, among other things, to the water needs of the local mining industry as well as the accident at the Bento Benitez mining dam in Brazil largely attest to this. . This is just as true for diamond mines. In Angola and Sierra Leone, decades of mining extraction have left these countries with serious environmental scars: soil erosion and pollution, disappearance of terrestrial and aquatic animal species, etc. This damage prevents agriculture and fishing from developing, and involves a necessary displacement of populations. They destabilize the ecosystem and socio-economic balance of these regions already weakened . The industry not given enough responsibility In addition to a definition that is too narrow, a second major problem is that the Kimberley process relies entirely on state structures. They in fact assume both the responsibility and the burden. The resulting problem is twofold. First, the effectiveness of internal controls varies greatly from one country to another, depending on whether or not a government has the financial, material and institutional resources to implement diamond certification. Second, the process does not place any constraints on the private mining industry, which is not required to perform any duty of due diligence. In fact, and this criticism can be extended to other regulatory instruments which rely on "good governance" practices (such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative or EITI), the SCKP provokes a discourse which "is embedded in the extractive industry's one-sided narrative, whereby the resource curse is attributed to poor governance and corruption ". That is to say, ultimately, to States and thus clears the extractive companies themselves of any responsibility. Finally, the lack of effectiveness of the sanctions provided for by the SCPK constitutes a third major flaw. These are purely economic: in the event that a country cannot certify its diamonds as “conflict free”, it is simply prohibited from trading in them. The bloody conflicts that the Central African Republic has experienced since 2013 have highlighted the ineffectiveness of such a response. In this country where diamonds represent 50% of national exports, the civil and religious war opposing the Muslim Seleka rebels to the anti-balaka Christians has in fact forced the SCPK to declare an embargo on Central African diamonds. However, this sanction was unable to prevent the internal trade in diamonds, nor their smuggling, while certain private companies were content to store diamonds purchased from armed factions while awaiting a lifting of the ban. economic blockade… How can we improve the fight against “blood diamonds”? As it is used today, the Kimberley Process deviates from the intentions that gave rise to it. The SCKP has failed in its mission to prevent armed conflicts. In the case of Zimbabwe, the process even amounts to legally covering a corrupt state accused of human rights violations against its own population. For years, civil society has been calling for the definition of SCKP to be broadened in order to intervene in a wider number of conflicts. An elected government which is itself guilty of acts of torture or exploitation with the aim of profiting from the diamond trade should indeed also be sanctioned, and this with an arsenal more ambitious than just the economic aspect. The question of human rights is therefore fundamental: these should be protected by the SCKP. On the one hand, NGOs and states in the North of the planet are demanding that they be taken into account. On the other hand, the private diamond sector is fiercely opposed to it, while China, Africa and other countries in the South of the planet see it as an attempt at political and economic interference on the part of the western powers . In their eyes, invoking democratic failures would serve as a pretext for Northern states to impose their political agenda. Saving the Kimberley process will, however, involve breaking this deadlock: it is inconceivable that the SCKP will continue to legitimize murderous and corrupt governments any longer. As things currently stand, private companies also readily use the KPCS as an excuse for not ensuring themselves the provenance of the diamonds they use. In doing so, they do not adhere to the principle of corporate social responsibility promoted by the OECD and officially recognized in 2011 by the Human Rights Council of United Nations . The process should be revised so as to involve companies in a binding manner so that they ensure (1) individual traceability of diamonds (rough and polished) and (2) transparency over their supply chain. It is illusory to think that we can make the market responsible by counting on the goodwill of private actors. To be effective, the principle of due diligence on the diamond supply chain must be made mandatory and be accompanied by significant, progressive sanctions adapted to the company's place in the supply chain and its size. It is the responsibility of companies to ensure control of their goods, and the duty of States to compel them to do so. Kim Tondeur

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