The artisanal mining sector in the East of the DRC: current situation and prospects

May 16, 2012

Economical actors, central Africa, Article, Conflict prevention, DR Congo, Natural resources, Testimonials

From March 19 to 30, 2012, Frédéric Triest, permanent member of Justice and Peace, went on a mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). He met various civil society actors in Bukavu, Goma and Kinshasa working on the management and impacts of the artisanal mining sector. The opportunity for Justice and Peace to take stock of the situation in this vital sector for the economy and reconstruction in the East, as well as for the establishment of lasting peace in the Region, and to propose some avenues action from Belgium and Europe.

I. Emergence of a sector in a context of the decline of the State The artisanal sector refers to mining activity when the extraction is carried out by individual people, artisan “diggers”, who work either on their own account or in an area that an individual makes available to them in exchange for the exclusivity of the sale or a percentage of what they collect . According to some estimates, artisanal production represents more than 80% of mining production exported by the DRC . The artisanal mining economy is a large-scale survival economy that affects hundreds of thousands of Congolese. It concerns the provinces of Katanga, Maniema, North Kivu, South Kivu, and the Orientale province (Ituri). Historically, it has not always been this way, particularly in the provinces of North and South Kivu. Unlike Katanga, these two provinces are not regions traditionally and primarily dedicated to mining, and in particular their mountainous part. Today, however, gold and coltan are mined almost everywhere. (tantalum ores), wolframite (tungsten ores) and cassiterite (tin ores). Industrial mining began there in 1923. After independence, mining activity in the region saw a gradual decline in profitability. In 1976, the Belgian company SOMINKI (Société Minière et Industrielle du Kivu, mixed company with a participation of 28% from the Congolese State) was created , with 47 concessions covering nearly 10,000 km², including 6 where it exploited gold: 3 in Kamituga and the other 3 in Lugushwa, Namoya, Twangiza. The economic slump of the 1980s led to a collapse in tin prices and forced SOMINKI to close most of its operations, apart from the gold sector which remained profitable, thus leaving free access to artisanal mining. At the same time, Mobutu liberalized artisanal mining, which mainly concerned Kasai and Katanga, in order to tame the discontent of the population and avoid social explosion. In 1996, the Canadian company BANRO bought all the shares held by the Belgian private shareholders of SOMINKI (i.e. 72% of the company). The outbreak of war in 1996 led to the looting of SOMINKI installations by the AFDL (Alliance of Democratic Forces for Liberation). Laurent-Désiré Kabila then contested the validity of the mining titles held by BANRO. With the outbreak of the second conflict in 1998 and the occupation of the Kivus by the RCD (Congolese Rally for Democracy), the former SOMINKI concessions were left in the hands of armed groups, local notables and artisanal miners. Since the signing of the Peace Accords in 2002, President Joseph Kabila has sought an amicable settlement with BANRO, which claimed a billion dollars in damages from the Congolese state before an international court of arbitration in Washington. A decree established in April 2003 authorized BANRO to recover its concessions. The company only took over gold mining, leaving cassiterite to the Congolese state. On November 20, 2003, an official ceremony in Bukavu sealed the opening of BANRO's activities . The Canadian company currently has 4 operating permits relating to the Kamituga, Lugushwa, Namoya and Twangiza gold concessions. Industrial gold production officially began in October 2011 in Twangiza where BANRO built a factory and operates an open-cast mine. The mining company is currently in the process of raising funds to build another factory in Namoya. Together with the cessation of industrial exploitation of the former SOMINKI concessions between 1996 and 2011, the development of the artisanal model in the Kivus is largely explained by what has been called the coltan boom in 1999- 2000. The price of this ore reached at that time 350$ per kilo. This surge was caused by the international market's anticipation of strong demand from computer and GSM manufacturers. As Asian foundries sought to diversify their supply from traditional sources (Australia, Canada), Congolese coltan was very competitive given the inexpensive artisanal form taken by its exploitation. Hoping to earn several dozen dollars in a few weeks, residents of the region, including many children, set out in search of the precious ore . It was under the effect of this boom that artisanal mining became a real economic escape for a large part of the population in the Kivus. For the two provinces, the number of diggers is estimated at around 400,000. For the province of South Kivu alone, the number of artisanal sites is estimated at nearly 900! Another key factor, of a geographical nature, explains the emergence of artisanal mining in the East: the isolation of the territories. Indeed, the lack of road and electrical infrastructure makes exploitation by industrial means practically impossible. Even before the question of the political instability of the country and the insecurity in the region, the installation of factories and the transport of minerals, from sites lost in the forest and sometimes several hundred kilometers away from the major urban centers, represent logistical and financial challenges that are difficult to overcome for investors, public or private, who may be interested in the subsoil of the Kivus. Artisanal exploitation logically presented itself as the most appropriate extraction model given the interaction of the aforementioned factors. In 2002, the DRC adopted a new Mining Code. One of the objectives of the new Code concerned the regulation of the artisanal sector, particularly targeted in Title IV of the text. The objectives of this new regulation (it did not appear in the previous Code) are to limit illegal practices, increase the safety of artisanal diggers, prevent conflicts linked to natural resources and avoid human rights violations. The new Code distributes skills relating to the sector between the Ministry of Mines (demarcation of artisanal mining zones), the provincial Governors (granting of trader cards for artisanal mining products) and the Heads of Provincial Divisions of mines (granting digger cards). II. The “poverty” trap of mining activity Despite its job creation effect, artisanal mining activity as it has developed in the east of the DRC is considered “a poverty trap”: behind the illusory appearance of easy enrichment in the very short term, it generates a dynamic of impoverishment. Diggers constitute a sociologically heterogeneous group. In Kivu, for people displaced by armed violence, salvation often comes from the mine, a local alternative to migration to a distant city. We also find people from cities on mining sites: young people who have dropped out of school and civil servants (teachers, etc.) whose salary, when it is received, does not allow them to support their families. In regions with a high population density, difficulties in accessing land for young people also explain their presence in mining activity. There are also former demobilized soldiers, particularly among the Mai Mai, who become minors. Finally, the mine offers economic opportunities for women, such as small catering for “mums” and the crushing/sieving/cleaning of ores. The diggers earn only minimal earnings from their work, with some studies estimating an average of between $1 and $2 per day. . Others, met during the CJP mission in March 2012, estimate that at certain times, these earnings can reach up to 10 to 20 dollars per day. Regardless, these gains are generally not capitalized by diggers who “burn it all”. Due to the isolation of the sites and the impact of transport costs, food and everyday consumer goods are two to three times more expensive than elsewhere. In addition, diggers spend part of their earnings on alcohol and prostitution. Many people end up falling into debt, especially during the rainy season when it is more difficult to work. Finally, the working conditions, which are precarious to say the least, seriously undermine the safety and health of workers: risk of landslides in shafts, use of explosives, respiratory illnesses linked to humidity in tunnels and dust. produced by manual crushing of ores. Small-scale mining therefore generally only allows short-term economic survival. However, if the fate of the diggers seems unenviable, what other escape route could they turn to? This sector provides means of survival to those trying to avoid falling into or out of absolute poverty. Without this final safety net, the social situation in Eastern Congo would be even more tense than it is currently. III. A suspension of mineral exports to the East (September 2010-March 2011)… Between September 11, 2010 and March 10, 2011, mineral exports from the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, and Maniema were suspended by President Kabila. The presidential decision to establish this export blockade can be explained in particular by the adoption in July 2010 by the American Congress of the American Dodd/Frank law. , consisting of provisions intended to reform Wall Street and strengthen protections for American consumers. Section 1502 of the law requires, beginning in 2012, companies registered with the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) whose products contain tin, coltan, tungsten or gold, to indicate whether they obtain these minerals in the DRC or in a neighboring country. If the mineral originates from the DRC, they are also required to inform of the “due diligence” measures taken to avoid obtaining minerals financing armed groups. Kabila therefore took the decision to suspend exports in order to put an end to the involvement of armed groups and civil authorities in the exploitation and trade of minerals and to prepare the Congolese artisanal mining sector for the implementation of American law. . As a result, artisanal production declined sharply during the six months of the blockade. IV. …Followed by a “de facto” embargo (April 2011-?) Despite the lifting of the mining blockade in March 2011, the chaotic situation it created continues. The reason lies in a “de facto embargo” against minerals from the East established by large companies in the electronics sector (computer and GSM manufacturers in particular). Indeed, the latter, who are the “final buyers” of coltan, tungsten and Congolese tin, fear the entry into force of section 1502 of the Dodd/Frank law. Unable to reasonably assure 100% that minerals from Congo do not finance any armed group, the “image risk” for these companies of being associated with the violence in the east of the DRC is too great. Also, even before the law was implemented, Asian foundries that sourced from the DRC stopped sourcing from Congolese purchasing counters in mid-2011. V. Slow production…except for gold! What about today ? Significantly slowed down, the artisanal production of coltan, tungsten and tin has not stopped. The artisanal sites are not abandoned, they are simply less frequented by diggers who are waiting for international buyers to return to business. Given the recent increase in the price of tin on the market, it is the sites where cassiterite is extracted which are currently mainly frequented. Comparatively, coltan is currently less attractive. During his mission, CJP was able to visit two cassiterite concessions located 80 km from Bukavu, near the town of Nzibira: Tchaminyagu and Nyamrerwe. On these sites, it seems that diggers are currently working to rehabilitate flooded wells after several months of inactivity. There is some production of ferrite and cassiterite, but diggers are waiting for trade to resume in earnest. In fact, there are only two mineral purchasing counters open in Bukavu, both Chinese. They continue to buy but, taking advantage of the situation, at a low price. For gold, the situation is different. The quantity extracted is difficult to estimate, but according to the actors met in the East, its production is not really decreasing. Indeed, the price of gold has soared since the economic crisis and, by its nature, it is a mineral whose supply chain is practically uncontrollable: it does not necessarily require an industrial process to be refined. and melted. It can therefore be transported on the roads by individuals without this being visible and, once it has left the mine, it is impossible to identify its origin. It is therefore easily “trafficked” illegally. According to information gleaned from the East, a significant part of South Kivu's gold leaves the DRC via Lake Tanganyika to be sold in Burundi. This gold would be purchased by individuals of Russian nationality based in Bujumbura who would then export it to Dubai. What is the point for these Russian operators to buy this gold in Burundi rather than in the DRC? The answer is simple: taxes are lower there. These tax disparities in the Great Lakes region constitute a significant incentive for the plunder of Congolese resources. A problem that has unfortunately not (yet?) been addressed by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). VI. Controversy surrounding section 1502 of American law Although it was initially supposed to come into force on January 1, 2012, the Dodd/Frank law is still not applicable, with the SEC delaying deciding on concrete enforcement measures provisions made by section 1502. The SEC is under pressure from large companies in the electronics sector who are threatening legal action before the American Chamber of Commerce. In addition, the legitimacy of these provisions is weakened by criticism, emanating from the DRC and also from abroad. These criticisms are based on the observation of negative socio-economic impacts for the population, in particular for diggers and other people directly and indirectly dependent on the sector. . On the security front, potential mining profits for armed groups (FDLR, FARDC, Mayi-Mayi militias) have been reduced due to the drop in production. But the involvement of armed groups in continued illegal exploitation and smuggling abroad has increased. VII. Presence of armed groups and violence: militarization of the economy which goes beyond the mining question It is a well-known fact, different armed groups, national and foreign, have financed themselves for nearly 15 years thanks to exploitation artisanal mining of minerals in the East of the DRC. This situation today makes this country the emblematic case, on the international scene, of the problem of blood “minerals”. The attention paid specifically to the case of the DRC explains the choice of the United States to apply reinforced control to Congolese minerals as to their “conflict-free” origin. We are therefore entitled to wonder what is the impact of the presidential suspension and the “de facto” embargo on the financing of armed groups present in the East. Overall, the armed protagonists continue to illegally derive income from the artisanal sector, whether through illicit taxation of production, remuneration of sector operators for their “protection”, control of commercial circuits around mining squares and use of coercive means (forced labor in the mine). The FDLR (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) today constitute the strongest foreign armed group in military terms. Their access to and control over mineral resources has been reduced, but tin and coltan continue to finance them in some of the territories and sectors of North (Lubero) and South Kivu (Walungu-Itombwe) . According to certain sources, fighters from the FNL (Forces Nationales de Libération, a rebel group from neighboring Burundi) are active in South Kivu where they derive significant income from the trade in natural resources (ore and timber). . The Mayi-Mayi militias and the FARDC (Congolese armed forces) also continue to finance themselves through the mining sector, mainly through gold and tin. The FARDC withdrew from several mining sites following the restructuring of certain units. Unfortunately, other units took the opportunity to strengthen their hold on certain sites, under the pretext of securing them. The FDLR and Mayi-Mayi militias were also able to redeploy to others left free from surveillance. Thus, the influence of armed groups on mining sites and traffic has been strengthened in several sectors. Violence against the civilian population as well. Indeed, given the loss of income linked to the decline in mining activity, certain villages have been victims of an increase in looting and kidnappings against payment of ransom. According to Father Didier de Failly, Director of BEST (Bureau d'Études Scientifiques et Techniques) of Bukavu, the militarization of mining sites by armed groups is largely explained by the geographical characteristics of the place where they are located, depending on whether whether they are bordered by tropical forest or not. Indeed, armed groups are generally active around landlocked sites where the forest is present, the proximity to this dense vegetation allowing them a certain discretion and rapid withdrawal if necessary. The altitude is preponderant here since this tropical forest only develops below 1000 meters. The economic factor alone therefore does not explain everything of the complex link linking the exploitation of natural resources and the presence of armed groups. The geographical factor, coupled with the isolation of the territories (lack of communication infrastructure), are certainly elements structurally favorable to illegal exploitation by armed groups in the region. However, if minerals continue to play a role in financing the various armed groups, it is clear that their economic strategies have diversified since 2009. The illegal exploitation of minerals is today only one of the components of these strategies. For example, the main sources of financing for the FDLR are the trade of commodities, the collection of illegal taxes and the sale of agricultural products (palm oil and cannabis). . This type of practice is attributable to all armed groups active in the region, as is the installation of illegal toll barriers along the main roads. We are therefore faced with a real militarization of the economy in the Kivus, which goes beyond the sole case of mining. VIII. The economic importance of artisanal activity in the East Following the different points of view collected during the mission, it seems that the positions held in the East and in Kinshasa are opposed regarding the present and future economic role of the artisanal mining sector. Indeed, the majority of representatives of civil society based in Kinshasa believe that this sector has and can only marginally contribute to the development of the Congolese nation. In their eyes, this sector only benefits a restricted part of the Congolese population in the east (diggers, armed groups, traders, trading posts, exporters). Largely informal, exploitation and trade from the artisanal sector escape state control and the tax revenues derived from it do not contribute significantly to public finances. Even if it were formalized, artisanal mining is not a “future” sector. For Kinshasa, it is a survival activity, offering few economic prospects and poor working conditions to the diggers. In addition, it encourages the presence of armed groups and violence against the population. In this regard, for example, according to Henri Muhiya of CERN (ad hoc Episcopal Commission for Natural Resources), agriculture and livestock represent much more interesting prospects in the long term, for a larger part of the population. . In the East, the point of view is different. Certainly informal and controlled largely by armed groups, this sector contributes significantly to the local economy, and not only to that of the large cities of the East, but also and above all to that of the numerous landlocked territories of the Kivus. The impact of the presidential suspension and the “de facto” embargo makes it possible to estimate (roughly) the role played by the artisanal sector in the region's economy. As has been said, a significant part of the Kivu territory is landlocked, due to the absence of roads or their dilapidation. Many villages are only accessible after several days of walking. With the development of artisanal activity, flights of small planes, transporting basic consumer products (soap, salt, etc.) on the outward journey and leaving on the return journey with minerals, had become profitable. Certainly, these planes served traffic, but they made it possible to maintain the flow of commerce towards regions which really needed it. Following measures suspending mineral exports, these flights were interrupted, further complicating the transport of basic products and subsequently causing their sales prices to explode in remote communities. Generally speaking, commercial activity is down in the region. As an indication, according to Aloys Tegera of the Pole Institute in Goma, exports from the province of North Kivu have decreased by two thirds and fuel consumption by half. This slowdown in the local economy represents a big shortfall for provincial finances. In addition, the artisanal sector creates significantly more jobs than the industrial sector, which generally hires only a small number of local workers. The start of BANRO's activity in Twangiza confirms this observation since out of the several thousand diggers active on the site before its arrival , the company only plans to hire 650. IX. Chaotic implementation of initiatives dedicated to the formalization of the artisanal sector In the eyes of local and international observers, the presidential suspension of September 2010 and the embargo that followed disrupted the implementation of numerous government or private initiatives aimed at formalizing the artisanal sector. mining sector in the East . Indeed, these initiatives have multiplied in recent years . They generally concern three distinct but complementary approaches : the “certification” of the conformity of shipments of “conflict-free” minerals, the “traceability” of minerals from their mine of origin and the “due diligence” process by which any company involved in the commercial sector ensures not to use conflict minerals. A fourth approach, less known but fundamental since it is a prerequisite to the other three, is added: the mapping of mining sites. Certification aims to ensure that mineral extraction in the DRC meets certain mandatory social, environmental and legal standards guaranteeing the “conflict-free” nature of the operation. The ICGLR, technically supported by the German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR), is currently leading the implementation of a certification mechanism for minerals produced in the East of the DRC and in the Greater Region. Lakes. In addition to the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda are the main countries involved in the implementation of the mechanism. The strength of this process is that it is mainly led by Governments and should result in a control system based on a strong institutional framework. Unfortunately, it is also from this strength that its current weakness comes: it will probably be necessary to wait a few years before the ICGLR certification system is fully operational, due to weak state capacities in the Region and the need to establish new institutions guaranteeing effective control. The BGR, through its “Certified Trading Chain” project, has developed a broader certification system for production sites, also including criteria for transparency and environmental and social ethics, which will allow then tracking the ore via a packaging and labeling device for cargo leaving the mines. To this administrative certification is added a geochemical certification of the minerals (identification of their geochemical footprint) in order to be able to “scientifically”, throughout the commercial chain, verify their geographical origin. The relevance of this system for the Congolese context nevertheless raises questions because it is very expensive. Traceability back to the source allows buyers to avoid sourcing from mines openly controlled by armed groups or the military. The objective here is to combat acts of ore extortion committed along transport routes and the use, by armed elements, of civilian intermediaries responsible for carrying out illegal commercial activities on their behalf. These two practices in fact constitute an essential method of financing the warring parties in the Kivus, which can only be identified through field assessments. The main current traceability initiatives are: (1) the iTSCI (Tin Supply Chain Initiative) mineral labeling scheme led by the tin industry (ITRI), (2) the validation process for tantalum smelters called “conflict-free smelters” (Conflict-Free Smelter-CFS) launched by the Global e-Sustainability Initiative (GESI ) and the “Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition-EICC ). Due diligence is the process by which any company involved in supply chains ensures that they do not use minerals that have financed armed groups. In summary, it is a methodology whose implementation makes it possible to gradually strengthen company management systems, in particular by establishing a system for tracking minerals from their mine of origin. This methodology consists of: (1) identifying and assessing the risks that the supply chain provides financing to armed groups (2) designing and implementing strategies to address the identified risks (3) using independent audits as to to the implementation of due diligence (4) publicly disclose the measures taken by companies. This approach is quicker and less expensive to implement than more complex certification regimes. The UN and then the OECD produced almost identical standards of care. ICGLR member states have adopted OECD standards as one of the tools of the “Regional Initiative on the Fight against Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources” and launched “an appeal to multinationals that source minerals in the Great Lakes Region to comply with [these] Directives ". On September 6, 2011, the Congolese Ministry of Mines made public a circular requiring all mining operators in the country to exercise, at all stages of the supply chain, due diligence of the UN and the OECD. On the ground, these measures are struggling to be implemented. Cartography (mapping) acts as a prerequisite to the three other approaches because it is impossible to account for the origin of minerals and follow their commercial journey if we do not initially have exhaustive knowledge of the production sites. from which they are extracted. Here too, several initiatives coexist. The Mining Cadastre administration is logically the organization which should ensure the collection of cartographic information and the updating of mining cartography. What it struggles to do for the artisanal sector. The 2002 Mining Code provided for the making available to the public and interested investors of the map of mining permits and quarry authorizations. Since October 2011, the Mining Cadastre website has contained a map of titles granted and being processed for the entire DRC . It is updated monthly. The Carter Center, for its part, has developed maps of industrial mining in Katanga province. Belgium is also present in this area thanks to two projects. The first, entitled “GECO Cartography” (Geology for an economical sustainable development), was launched at the initiative of the Royal Museum for Central Africa in Tervuren and aims to make a vast database available to authorities, investors and to the general public. The GECO project site includes interactive mapping and contains information on known deposits across the DRC . The second project is that of Conflict Mapping, launched by the International Peace Information Service (IPIS) in Antwerp, with the financial support of Belgian Foreign Affairs. It mainly consists of the development, since 2005, of a series of maps aimed at studying the links between conflicts on the one hand, and their underlying causes on the other. These causes include (but are not limited to) the presence of natural resources in conflict regions, particularly in the Kivus and surrounding districts (Orientale and Maniema provinces, North Katanga). . X. What will be the role of the artisanal sector in the development of the DRC? After 15 years of chaotic existence, the artisanal sector in the east of the DRC is facing a decisive turning point for its future. The situation described in this analysis allows us to draw some lessons and ask key questions. The militarization of the economy in the East goes far beyond the mining sector alone. Also, tackling the links between minerals and the financing of armed groups is not enough and a broader approach is necessary if we want to put an end to insecurity and violence in the Region. It is logical to note that the adoption of section 1502 of the Dodd/Frank Act, although its objectives are laudable, cannot alone address the complexity of the situation. It also provoked distrust in the private sector which preferred to stop its mineral purchases. The primary cause designated almost unanimously by the actors met in the DRC during the mission, both with regard to the militarization of exploitation and the embargo of the private sector, is the weakness of the State and its inability to administer, from Kinshasa, the eastern territories. In the Kivus, the way is therefore left open to armed groups who extend their control over the local economy and perpetuate, with complete impunity, their abuses against the population (looting, kidnappings, rapes, assassinations). Due to a lack of resources and skills, the local administration cannot properly supervise the artisanal sector, compromising the emergence of the conditions necessary for the implementation of due diligence. The first problem is therefore, as is often the case, that of governance. It is primarily on it that the restoration of the confidence of buyers and users, and the long-awaited resumption of activity in the East, depend. This recovery is desirable, not only from the point of view of the economic survival of the diggers, but also from the points of view of the security and economic development of the Region because, as Aloys Tegera points out, “how can we develop initiatives to formalize the sector if there is no more activity at all? ". Formalization is a necessary condition in order to guide the functioning of the artisanal sector and put it at the service of the development of the population. In this regard, and considering the divergence of views between the East and Kinshasa mentioned in the previous point, an essential question remains unresolved: what is the vision of the Congolese state regarding the future of the artisanal mining sector? During his first term, it seems that President Kabila took little interest in it. Some explain this attitude by the fact that the industrial sector, from which lucrative contracts with private (Canada, United States, England, South Africa) or public (China) international mining operators result, is more financially interesting. Compared to the millions of “cash” dollars generated by the industrial sector which arrive directly on the government table in Kinshasa, the artisanal activity of the remote eastern provinces seems unattractive. Furthermore, putting the artisanal sector in order constitutes taking risks since it means attacking the many interests of those who, in Kinshasa and elsewhere, have benefited for 15 years from the absence of the State and from looting. Concretely, Kinshasa's intentions regarding the future of the artisanal mining sector will need to be clarified. Ultimately, is artisanal exploitation doomed to give way to industrial exploitation? Or, will there be a coexistence, as civil society demands in the East, of the two models of exploitation? This clarification, this common vision, is necessary if the DRC wants the formalization of the artisanal sector to be more supported by the State itself, by its partner countries, by donors and by the private sector. XI. Courses of action The sanitation of the sector cannot become reality if the various current and future initiatives continue to be implemented in a chaotic and disorderly manner. According to Eric Kajemba of OGP (Governance and Peace Observatory), action should be structured around four stages. The first is to reestablish the authority of the chain of command within the FARDC and demilitarize mines and commerce. The second step should be the establishment of a complete mining cadastre, clarifying which concession can be exploited industrially or artisanally. It is only following the first two that the third stage can be effectively implemented, namely support for the artisanal sector. This can be done via the initiatives to formalize exploitation and trade mentioned above (certification, traceability, due diligence) or via direct support to diggers (technical support, access to credit). Finally, a fourth and final step is necessary for the industrial and artisanal mining sectors to be vectors of development: ensuring the positive impact for local communities, both on the socio-economic level and on the environmental aspects and respect collective and individual rights. Based on this structure, different courses of action from Belgium and Europe can be put forward. One of the lessons that the EU must learn from the experience of the Dodd/Frank law is that establishing effective verification of the “conflict-free” origin of minerals cannot be achieved solely through control measures. businesses. In addition, we must support the capacities of the Congolese authorities to establish operating conditions allowing national and foreign companies to respect due diligence standards. We must also support civil society more in its ability to dialogue with public authorities and play its role in controlling the management of natural resources at the local level. 1) Improvement of the governance of the Congolese State Belgium and Europe must continue to put pressure on President Kabila and his Government. Indeed, as we have said, many of the problems in the Kivus have their roots in the weakness of governance from Kinshasa. Beyond speeches and declarations of good intentions, this improvement should result in the following actions: a. Support the reform of the army and justice sectors (see 1st step): the government should keep its commitment to withdraw the army from mining sites and prosecute individuals involved in the illegal mineral trade. To do this, he must re-establish the authority of the official chain of command within the FARDC, arrest soldiers involved in exploitation and trade, and guarantee the independence of the courts before which they must be brought. judged. b. Support the establishment of a complete cadastre of mining sites (see 2nd stage): Belgium has a particular role to play here given its expertise in Congolese geology and geography (maps). In addition to the initiatives it already supports , it could provide more direct support to the Cadastre administration. The objective would be to obtain a truly exhaustive map of concessions which makes it possible to identify those which will be dedicated to artisanal exploitation or industrial exploitation. vs. Support the development of transport infrastructure (see 1st and 3rd stages): the return to security and a formal economy requires the rehabilitation of transport infrastructure. This conditions the secure movement of the population and the connection of landlocked rural areas to secure markets and trading centers. d. Encourage direct support for artisan diggers (see 3rd step): this involves giving them access to credits and supporting them on technical and commercial levels. The objective is the creation of small semi-mechanized businesses, which would improve working conditions, the viability of the activity and the positive impact on the local economic fabric. e. Obtain the holding of free and transparent local and provincial elections (see 3rd and 4th steps): following the conduct of the presidential and legislative elections at the end of 2011, the DRC is experiencing a major crisis of legitimacy of the institutions constituting the State (Presidency, Government, Parliament, etc.). To deal with this crisis and Kinshasa's inability to administer the eastern territories, it is appropriate to continue the decentralization process as provided for by the Constitution and to organize free and fair local and provincial elections as quickly as possible. transparent. Replacing the current local representatives designated by Kinshasa with elected officials chosen by the population, who will therefore be directly accountable to them, is a priority, not only on the general democratic level, but also on that of natural resource management. Indeed, these elected officials will have to ensure that this management respects the law, promotes efforts to formalize the artisanal sector and meets the interests of local communities living near the operating areas. f. Guide a revision of the Mining Code favorable to formalization and the interests of the population (see 3rd and 4th stages): the Mining Code, after ten years of existence, will be revised in 2012. If the 2002 Code has the merit of formally recognize the artisanal sector and the status of artisan digger, it is poorly applied and remains unknown by a large majority of players in the sector. Also, the legal recognition of diggers must be strengthened. The Congolese Government should include directly in the Code the provisions it intends to implement with a view to formalizing the artisanal sector (certification, traceability and due diligence). In addition, the review should be carried out in dialogue with Kivu civil society, particularly women, working on the management of natural resources in the two provinces. It should lead to local communities finally being able to benefit from positive spin-offs from artisanal and industrial mining. g. Strengthen support for Congolese civil society working on the good management of natural resources (see 3rd and 4th stages): In order to stop the system of exploitation inherited from the Mobutu era, Congolese civil society must play its role more. monitoring the exploitation of natural resources and alerting public opinion. In particular, it needs to be trained on aspects as diverse as the functioning of the mining sector and the international market for raw materials (commodities), the legislative texts governing mining in the DRC and setting out the rights and duties of stakeholders, initiatives to formalize the sector, the gender dimension in the management of natural resources, methods of collecting information and monitoring in the field, etc. Thus reinforced, it will then be able to fulfill its role of social control and outreach to the diggers and the population. 2) European legislative initiative: corporate accountability and transparency in supply chains Europe, as a major consumer of minerals, cannot remain behind and must, as the United States has done (see section 1502), take legislative measures to make our companies responsible for the conditions under which minerals from third countries are extracted. To do this, transparency in mineral supply chains to Europe must be strengthened. The European Union (EU) seems to have realized this. Also, European Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht pledged in January 2012 that the Commission would advocate "greater use and respect of the recently updated OECD guidelines for multinational companies, as well as OECD recommendations on due diligence and responsible supply chain management” [European Commission, Trade, Growth and Development. Adjust trade and investment policy to countries that need help most, 01/27/2012, see http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/january/tradoc_148996.pdf[] ]. According to our information, the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) are busy defining the type of initiative that the EU could take in this area. One of the main challenges for the EU is to avoid the difficulties encountered by the implementation of section 1502 of the Dodd/Frank Act. Also, for the European initiative to be effective, we recommend that the European Commission: a. Consult Congolese civil society: above all, it is desirable that civil society, particularly that based in the East, be consulted by the European authorities responsible for developing the initiative. The Commission must certainly consider the delicate question of the competitiveness of European companies. But it must base its approach on understanding the local issues of mining and integrate the question of impacts for the local population. b. Avoid focusing all the attention on the DRC: the main criticism that can be leveled at section 1502 of the Dodd/Frank Act is that it has focused all the attention and mistrust of the private sector on the DRC. However, this country is not the only “risk region” on the planet. In addition to being unfair and biased, the American approach is partial because it does not cover other regions of the world where mining is actually or potentially problematic in terms of violence and infringement of people's rights. vs. Strengthens existing initiatives: it is essential that the future European initiative is consistent with the initiatives currently implemented in the DRC and the Great Lakes Region . The point is not to create a new approach, competing with those that already exist. We recall here the call made to the European Commission a year ago by European civil society to adopt the OECD standards for due diligence and responsible supply chain management as a reporting standard for businesses . d. Makes its initiative binding: it is crucial to make EU measures obligatory, not optional, to hold businesses accountable and ensure transparency in supply chains. Indeed, if this is not the case, many companies will not carry out the necessary checks, thus putting at a disadvantage those companies which will strive to improve things. e. Take a gradual approach towards the private sector: as seen in the case of section 1502, the private sector needs time to adapt to the implementation of due diligence. In order to avoid the type of embargo encountered in the Congolese case, the implementation of the European initiative should therefore be done gradually, with for example transitional and support measures, without this calling into question its obligatory nature. Frédéric Triest

Attachments

The artisanal mining sector in the East of the DRC: current situation and prospects

Notes[+]

Notes
↑1	World Bank, The Democratic Republic of Congo: good governance in the mining sector as a factor of growth, May 2008, p.63.
↑2	M. Mazalto, “Reform of the mining sector in the Democratic Republic of Congo: governance issues and reconstruction prospects”, in Afrique contemporain, n°227, 2008/3, p.65.
↑3	“Coltan” is the nickname given by the Congolese to columbo-tantalite. After sieving and refining, what remains is tantalum which is an excellent conductor of electricity, easily malleable and very resistant to corrosion and heat. Although currently only 5% to 10% of world production comes from DR Congo – in the east, the Kivu provinces – Africa is said to have more than 60% of world reserves and that Kivu coltan contains the one of the highest levels of tantalum in the world.
↑4	Didier de Failly, “Coltan: to understand…”, in L'Afrique des Grands Lacs, directory 2000-2001, Center for the Study of the Great Lakes Region, Antwerp, L'Harmattan, p. 281-306.
↑5	Frank Mayundo Muyuba, Mining in South Kivu: the responsibility of companies and the State, University of CEPROMAD Bukavu/Sud-Kivu/RD, 2006.
↑6	Aloys Tegera, “Coltan explained to my son”, in Regards Croissants, n°30 bis, Pole Institue, Goma, October 2011, p.64-67.
↑7	International Alert, Study on the role of the exploitation of natural resources in fueling and perpetuating crises in Eastern DRC, London, October 2009.
↑8	Ibidem, p.64.
↑9	US Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
↑10	The ICGLR is an intergovernmental process established in 2004 involving eleven States of the African Great Lakes and aimed at establishing peace in the Region. In June 2008, it promulgated a “Protocol on the fight against the illegal exploitation of natural resources”.
↑11	Didier Verbruggen, Evie Francq and Jeroen Cuvelier, Guide to Current Mining Reform Initiatives in Eastern DRC, International Peace Information Service (IPIS), Antwerp, April 2011. See also Sarah Zingg Wimmer and Filip Hilgert, Bisie. A one-year snapshot of the DRC's main cassiterite mine, International Peace Information Service (IPIS), Antwerp, November 2011.
↑12	United Nations Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo, Final Report 2011, United Nations Security Council, December 2011, p.37-40.
↑13	Ibidem, p.51-52.
↑14	United Nations Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo, op. cit., p.51-52.
↑15	Catholic Relief Service (CRS) and Episcopal Commission for Natural Resources (CERN), Study of needs. Mining communities of Luttwinja, Mukungwe, Ninja and Nzibira (South Kivu – DRC), October 2011.
↑16	Some censuses show 13,000 people. The exact figure would be around 6,000.
↑17	Sarah Zingg Wimmer and Filip Hilgert, op. quote..
↑18	See in particular, Didier Verbruggen, Evie Francq and Jeroen Cuvelier, op. quote..
↑19	Global Witness, The future of the Congolese mineral trade hangs in the balance: opportunities and obstacles associated with demilitarization, May 18, 2011, see: p.6-7.
↑20	GESI is an organization made up of private information and communications companies, dedicated to promoting the sustainability of information and communications technologies.
↑21	The EICC is another organization of private companies in the electronics and information and communications technology sectors. It promotes an industry code of conduct for global supply chains that improve working and environmental conditions.
↑22	“OECD Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains for Minerals from Conflict or High-Risk Areas.”
↑23	See http://www.flexicadastre.com/drcmapportal/. See http://www.congomines.org/map/.
↑24	See http://www.gecoproject.org/.
↑25	See http://www.ipisresearch.be/mapping
↑26	See previously “Chaotic implementation of initiatives dedicated to the formalization of the artisanal sector”.
↑27	See previously “Chaotic implementation of initiatives dedicated to the formalization of the artisanal sector”.